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Aguilar v. Felton: Will the Court
Disentangle the Lemon Test?
I. Introduction
In Aguilar v. Felton,' the United States Supreme Court
struck down a New York City program which utilized federal
funds provided under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 19652 to pay the salaries of public school pro-
fessionals providing special services in parochial schools. The
funds were used to conduct such programs as remedial reading
and mathematics, reading skills, English as a second language,
and guidance services.3 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme
1. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985). The case was decided with Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985). In Grand Rapids, the Court struck down two Michigan
programs, a Shared Time Program and a Community Education Program. Id. at 3218.
These programs were held to violate the establishment clause because they had the pri-
mary or principal effect of advancing religion. The Shared Time Program offered supple-
mental classes to students in nonpublic schools during the regular school day. Id. at
3218. The classes were taught by full-time public school teachers. Id. at 3219. The Com-
munity Education Program involved classes offered to both children and adults that
commenced at the end of the regular school day in nonpublic schools. Id. at 3219. The
Community Education classes were taught by part-time public school employees. Id.
Both programs were conducted in nonpublic schools, but the classrooms were leased by
the public school system at a rate of six dollars per classroom per week. Of the forty-one
nonpublic schools involved in the two programs, forty were sectarian in character. Id. at
3220.
The Court stated three ways in which the programs had the primary effect of ad-
vancing religion. First, the possibility existed that the public school teachers would be
influenced by the sectarian nature of the schools and would indoctrinate students to
religious teachings at public expense. Second, the public support of instruction in secta-
rian school buildings threatened to convey to students and the public a message of gov-
ernment support for religion. Third, the programs were, in effect, state subsidies of paro-
chial schools because the programs relieved the schools of the responsibility of teaching
certain subjects. Id. at 3218.
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-4206 (1986).
3. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3234.
4. Justice Brennan wrote for the majority joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens. Justice Powell joined in the result but wrote a concurring opinion. Dissent-
ing opinions were filed by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor.
(In the U.S. Law Week report of this case there is a dissenting opinion written by Justice
White. This opinion does not appear in the Supreme Court Reports' report of the case.)
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Court was sharply divided over the appropriate means of analyz-
ing whether a program violated the establishment clause. The
majority held that the program offended the three-part test
evinced in Lemon v. Kurtzman.5 Because the public school pro-
fessionals had to be supervised within the parochial schools, the
Court determined that the program had the potential for exces-
sive entanglement between government and religion, therefore
violating the establishment clause of the first amendment.6 The
dissenters disagreed both with the majority's analysis under the
Lemon test and the appropriateness of the test itself.7
Part II of this Note examines the genesis of the establish-
ment clause and the precedents set by prior establishment
clause cases. Part III sets out the facts and lower court decision
of Aguilar v. Felton. The majority opinion, Justice Powell's con-
currence and the critical dissent of Justice O'Connor are ex-
amined in Part IV. Finally, this Note concludes in Part V with
an analysis of the strengths and shortcomings of these opinions,
as well as a discussion of the need for the complete Lemon test.
II. Background
The Constitution of the United States guarantees that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."' The first
clause of this amendment is considered to be the establishment
clause, while the second clause is considered the free exercise
clause.' Although the intent of the Framers of the Constitution
5. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3235, 3238. The Court stated that the "pervasive
monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian schools infringes precisely those Estab-
lishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entanglement ....
[Tihe religious school, which has as a primary purpose the advancement and preserva-
tion of a particular religion must endure the ongoing presence of state personnel whose
primary purpose is to monitor teachers and students in an attempt to guard against the
infiltration of religious thought." Id. at 3238-39.
7. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3232, 3247 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in full: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free excercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."
9. The free exercise clause was recognized as applicable to the states in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (state statute requiring individual to obtain certificate
to solicit money for religious cause and giving public official authority to deny certificate
[Vol. 6:639
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is often cited as support for a given interpretation of these reli-
gion clauses, the historical record as to their origin is somewhat
ambiguous.' 0 The brief historical discussion which follows is
meant to outline the Court's interpretation of the Framers' in-
tent without commenting on the historical veracity of that
interpretation.
A. Origin of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
Although many of the early settlers fled to the American
colonies in order to escape religious persecution, that fact alone
does not explain the purpose of the religion clauses. At the time
the Bill of Rights was adopted, state established churches ex-
isted in several states, and it is possible that the first amend-
ment was intended only to prohibit congressional interference
with religion." Also, there were at least three prevailing views of
the religion clauses' purpose at the time the first amendment
based on official's determination of whether cause was religious or not was held to be a
restraint upon the free exercise of religion forbidden by the fourteenth amendment). The
establishment clause was first applied to the states in Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state statute authorizing reimbursement of school transportation ex-
penses held not to violate the establishment clause made applicable to states through
fourteenth amendment).
The Cantwell Court recognized the importance of extending the guarantees of reli-
gious freedom to the states.
The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incom-
petent as Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legislation
on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls com-
pulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of wor-
ship .... On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form
of religion.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 303.
10. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1963) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan cautioned that
[a] too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon the issues of
these [religion and schools] cases seems to me futile and misdirected for several
reasons: First, on our precise problem the historical record is at best ambiguous,
and statements can readily be found to support either side of the proposition.
Id. at 237. See generally Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development Part 11. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 516-22.
11. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465 (1961). "The purpose of the Es-
tablishment Clause was to assure that the national legislature would not exert its power
in the service of any purely religious end; that it would not, as Virginia and virtually all
of the Colonies had done, make of religion, as religion, an object of legislation." (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). Id.
1986]
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was ratified. Roger Williams represented the evangelical view
that the separation of church and state would protect religion
from government interference. 2 Thomas Jefferson supported
the view that separation would protect government from reli-
gion.' 3 The third view, held by James Madison and others, was
that separation would allow church and state to each attain their
own high purpose.' Generally, the Supreme Court has consid-
ered the views of Madison and Jefferson to be the predecessors
to the first amendment.' 5
The gravaman of the concerns articulated above found ex-
pression in the establishment and free exercise clauses, and to-
gether these clauses protect religious freedom.'0 The establish-
12. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 817 (1978).
Roger Williams saw separation largely as a vehicle for protecting churches against
the state. To the extent that it was possible to accept state aid without state con-
trol, he urged cooperation; indeed, he argued that the state must "countenance,
encourage, and supply" those in religious service. Thus, his view has been called
one of positive toleration, imposing on the state the burden of fostering a climate
conducive to all religion.
(citing Whitson, American Pluralism, THOUGHT (Winter, 1962, at 402)).
13. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 817.
Thomas Jefferson, in contrast, saw separation as a means of protecting the state
from the church. As early as 1779, he presented a bill to the Virgina Legislature to
disestablish the tax-supported Anglican church. He also urged that the clergy be
barred from public office. That view would today strike many as violative of free
exercise, but it was Jefferson's conviction that only the complete separation of
religion from politics would eliminate the formal influence of religious institutions
and provide for a free choice among political views....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
14. Id. "James Madison believed that both religion and government could best
achieve their high purposes if each were left free from the other within its respective
sphere .. " Id.
15. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First Amendment,
in the drafting and adoption of which [James] Madison and [Thomas] Jefferson
played such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide
the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Vir-
ginia statute.
Id.
16. See Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1680 (1969).
Three such [policy] grounds need to be considered: voluntarism in matters of reli-
gion, mutual abstention of the political and the religious caretakers, and govern-
mental neutrality toward religions and between religion and non-religion. In a
large sense, both of the guarantees of the first amendment - the free-exercise
and the non-establishment clauses - are directed harmoniously toward these
purposes, though in the context of specific governmental measures the two guar-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/3
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ment clause generally bars the inhibition of religious choice
which arises from government aid to a particular religion. 17 The
free exercise clause generally bars the curbing of religious prac-
tice through government penalties which place a burden on reli-
gious belief.18 Although both of the clauses protect the freedom
of religious belief and practice, there is a natural antagonism be-
tween them that has often been troublesome for the courts. 19
In attempting to maintain a balance in the face of such ten-
sion, the Supreme Court has recognized two fundamental princi-
ples underlying the religion clauses; voluntarism and separa-
tism.2 0 Separatism has been viewed as more than an institutional
isolation between church and state; it is a recognition that "the
state should not become involved in religious affairs and that
sectarian differences should not be allowed unduly to fragment
the body politic. 21 The Court has gradually developed a test
antees may point in different directions and the purposes themselves may be
discordant.
Id. at 1684.
17. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 818-19.
The establishment clause, at least when interpreted broadly and applied to the
states, can be understood as designed in part to assure that the advancement of a
church would come only from the voluntary support of its followers and not from
the political support of the state. Religious groups, it was believed, should prosper
or perish on the intrinsic merit of their beliefs and practices. The establishment
clause, then, might also be seen as an expression of religious voluntarism.
Id. See also Gianella supra note 10, at 514.
18. Id. at 818.
The free exercise clause was at the very least designed to guarantee freedom of
conscience by preventing any degree of compulsion in matters of belief. It prohib-
ited not only direct compulsion but also any indirect coercion which might result
from subtle discrimination; hence, it was offended by any burden based specifi-
cally on one's religion. So viewed, the free exercise clause is a mandate of religious
voluntarism.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
19. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). "The Court has struggled to find
a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute
terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other." Id. at 668-69. For example, if all penalties are barred by the free exercise clause,
undue aid to religion may result and, likewise, if all aid is barred by the establishment
clause, undue penalties against religion may result. See infra text accompanying notes
27-28. See also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
20. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 818. "What emerges from the Court's examination of
history is a pair of fundamental principles, seen in the Court's religion discussions as
animating the first amendment: voluntarism and separatism." Id.
21. Id. at 819. See generally Freund, supra note 16, at 1684-86.
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under the establishment clause to protect these two fundamen-
tal principles. The constitutionality of public aid to parochial
schools has often been at issue as the test became established.
B. Modern Establishment Clause Doctrine and Aid to Reli-
gious Schools Cases
The use of public funds to aid parochial schools has been a
contested issue in much of the establishment clause litigation. In
fact, the modern Court's first encounter with the establishment
clause dealt with that very issue.22 In Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation,23 the Court upheld a New Jersey program which reim-
bursed parents of children in parochial schools for the cost of
bus transportation.2 4 The New Jersey program applied to all
public and nonpublic school children attending non-profit
schools and, therefore, revealed no preference on the part of the
state for religious schools.2 5 Also, the state did not contribute
money to the schools themselves.2" The Court held that bus
transportation was similar to those basic government services,
such as fire and police protection, that could be constitutionally
22. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 3. "The appellee, a township board of education, acting pursuant to this
statute, authorized reimbursement to parents of money expended by them for the bus
transportation of their children on regular busses operated by the public transportation
system." Id. This program included "the transportation of school children to and from
school, other than a public school, except such school as is operated for profit in whole or
in part." Id. at 3, note 1. The Court also stated, "we cannot say that the First Amend-
ment prohibits New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of paro-
chial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils
attending public and other schools." Id. at 17.
25. Id. at 3, 16.
New Jersey cannot consistently with the "establishment of religion" clause of the
First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution
which teaches the tenets and faith of any church.... While we do not mean to
intimate that a state could not provide transportation only to children attending
public schools, we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against
state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New
Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without re-
gard to their religious belief.
Id. at 16.
26. Id. at 18. "The State contributes no money to the schools. It does not support
them." Id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/3
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extended to religious institutions. 7 The Court also cautioned
that it must not strike down a statute merely because it neared
the verge of impermissible government power.28 In so doing,
however, the Court stated that "[t]he First Amendment has er-
ected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept
high and impregnable. 2 9 But while Everson established that
state aid to transport nonpublic school students is permissible,
courts have struggled to identify the scope of the states' author-
ity in this area.30
27. Id. at 17.
It is undoubtedly true that children are helped to get to church schools. There is
even a possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the church
schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children's bus fares out of their
own pockets when transportation to a public school would have been paid for by
the State. . . .Similarly, parents might be reluctant to permit their children to
attend schools which the state had cut off from such general government services
as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public
highways and sidewalks. Of course, cutting off church schools from these services,
so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function, would
make it far more difficult for the schools to operate. But such is obviously not the
purpose of the First Amendment.
Id. at 17-18. See also Giannella, supra note 10, at 520. See also Freund, supra note 16, at
1682.
28. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 16. "We must consider the New Jersey
statute in accordance with the foregoing limitations imposed by the First Amendment.
But we must not strike that state statute down if it is within the State's constitutional
power even though it approaches the verge of that power." Id.
29. Id. at 18.
30. See, e.g., Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Benton, 413
F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (Iowa statute which provided transportation to non-
public school students outside the school district where they resided struck down be-
cause statute aided a special class which consisted largely of religious school students);
Vissar v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949) (transpor-
tation aid for religious school students violated Washington's state constitutional prohi-
bition against using state funds to aid sectarian groups); see also Matthews v. Quinton,
362 P.2d 932, 939 (Alaska 1961) (state aid to transportation of nonpublic school students
violates state constitution), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 517 (1962); Gurney
v. Ferguson, 122 P.2d 1002 (Okla. 1941) (state aid to transportation of nonpublic school
students violates state constitution). Several states have also disregarded claims that
nonpublic school students are denied equal protection by not providing publicly funded
transportation. See, e.g., Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Mo. 1973),
aff'd, 419 U.S. 888 (1974); Epeldi v. Engelking, 94 Idaho 390, 488 P.2d 860 (1971), cert.
denied; 406 U.S. 957 (1972). But see State ex. rel. Hughes v. Board of Educ., 154 W. Va.
107, 174 S.E.2d 711 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 944 (1971) (because local school board
chose to provide bus transportation for public school students under a state law which
permitted but did not require it to do so, local school board also had to provide such
transportation for nonpublic school students); Attorney Gen. v. School Comm., 387
1986]
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In Board of Education v. Allen,31 the Court upheld a New
York statute which required local public school authorities to
loan textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven
through twelve, including parochial school children.32 In reach-
ing its conclusion, the Court applied a purposes and effects
test.3 3 The Court found that the program did not have a secta-
rian or religious purpose which would have rendered the pro-
gram unconstitutional.3 4 The Court also determined that the
program did not have the primary effect of advancing religion
because the textbooks were used solely as secular teaching com-
ponents.3 5 Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no vio-
Mass. 326, 439 N.E.2d 770 (1982) (state statute aiding transportation of nonpublic school
students upheld); State ex. rel. Bouc v. School Dist., 211 Neb. 731, 320 N.W.2d 472
(1982) (state statute aiding transportation of nonpublic school students upheld); School
Dist. v. Commonwealth Dep't of Educ., 33 Pa. Comm'n. 535, 382 A.2d 772 (1978), aff'd
sub noma., Springfield School Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 483 Pa. 539, 397 A.2d 1154, appeal
dismissed, 403 U.S. 901 (1979) (state statute aiding transportation of nonpublic school
students upheld). The following states have passed statutes which aid transportation of
nonpublic school students with public funding: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Kentucky, Lousiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. See K. ALEXANDER, SCHOOL LAW 186 (1980); M. McCAR-
THY, A DELICATE BALANCE: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SCHOOLS 118-20 (1983); New York
amended its state constitution in 1938 to provide for public funding for such transporta-
tion. N.Y. CONST., art. XI, § 3.
31. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
32. Id. at 238. "A law of the State of New York requires local public school authori-
ties to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven through 12; students
attending private schools are included.... We hold that the law is not in violation of the
Constitution." Id.
33. Id. at 243. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
[T]he Establishment Clause has been directly considered by this Court eight
times in the past score of years and, with only one Justice dissenting on the point,
it has consistently held that the clause withdrew all legislative power respecting
religious belief or the expression thereof. The test may be stated as follows: what
are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? ... That is to say that
to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.
Id. at 222.
34. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243. "The express purpose of § 701 was
stated by the New York Legislature to be furtherance of the educational opportunities
available to the young. Appellants have shown us nothing about the necessary effects of
the statute that is contrary to its stated purpose." Id.
35. Id. at 248.
[W]e cannot agree with appellants either that all teaching in a sectarian school is
religious or that the processes of secular and religious training are so intertwined
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/3
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lation of the establishment clause. 6 Subsequent to Allen, the
Court has generally upheld textbook programs. 7 This decision is
also important, however, because it represented a significant
step in the development of the three-part test evinced by the
Court in later establishment clause decisions.
The three-part test was first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,8 where the Court struck down Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island statutes which provided public funds for teachers' salaries
in nonpublic schools, including parochial schools.3 9 In so doing,
that secular textbooks furnished to students by the public are ir, fact instrumental
in the teaching of religion. . . . Nothing in this record supports the proposition
that all textbooks, whether they deal with mathematics, physics, foreign lan-
guages, history, or literature, are used by the parochial schools to teach religion.
Id.
36. Id. In dissent, Justice Black, who authored the Court's opinion in Everson, dis-
tinguished state support to transport nonpublic school students from the use of state tax
dollars to supply books. Id. at 251-54 (Black, J., dissenting). While school books were
"the most essential tool of education," transportation was a mere public welfare service.
Id. at 253-54. Also dissenting, Justice Fortas claimed that New York's program was
"hand-tailored to satisfy the specific needs of sectarian schools" because sectarian au-
thorities chose the books. Id. at 271 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Also dissenting, Justice
Douglas queried the Court's willingness to support such aid, because text books were
"the chief... instrumentality for propogating a particular religious creed or faith." Id. at
257 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
37. See J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1033 (1983). The
Supreme Court has held in several instances that public funds may be used to purchase
secular textbooks in order to loan them to sectarian school students. See also Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (Ohio statute upheld); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975) (Pennsylvania statute upheld). In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), how-
ever, the Court held that textbooks cannot be loaned to private schools which are racially
exclusive because such state aid would unconstitutionally foster racial discrimination.
State statutes which permit use of state funds for textbook use in nonpublic schools exist
in Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island. See K. ALEX-
ANDER, SCHOOL LAW at 193. But see Public Funds for Pub. Schoolsv. Marburger, 358 F.
Supp. 29 (D. N.J. 1973), aff'd mer., 417 U.S. 961 (1974) (state law which reimbursed
parents of nonpublic school students for costs of textbooks with state funds held inva-
lid). State courts have also invalidated state provided textbooks to nonpublic school stu-
dents as violative of the state constitution. See Dickman v. School Dist., 232 Or. 328, 366
P.2d 533 (1961), cert. denied sub. nom., Carlson v. Dickman, 371 U.S. 823 (1962); Bloom
v. Springfield School Comm., 376 Mass. 35, 379 N.E.2d 578 (1978); In re Advisory Opin-
ion, 394 Mich. 41, 228 N.W.2d 772 (1975); Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974),
cert denied, 419 U.S. 1111 (1975); Gaffney v. State Dep't of Educ., 192 Neb. 358, 220
N.W.2d 550 (1974); California Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300,
632 P.2d 953 (1981). See also MCCARTHY, supra note 30, at 121-23.
38. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
39. Id. at 607. Under the Pennsylvania program, the state was authorized to reim-
burse "nonpublic schools for their actual expenditures for teachers' salaries, textbooks,
1986]
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the Court announced a test for analyzing the constitutionality of
nonpublic school aid programs which consisted of three prongs.40
First, the test required that the program have a secular legisla-
tive purpose.41 Second, the program could not have the principal
or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Finally,
the program must not involve the government in excessive en-
tanglement with religion.43
The Court in Lemon found that both of the programs at
issue were unconstitutional because they involved excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion.44 Under both programs, the
states would be required to provide surveillance of teachers in
the parochial schools to ensure that religion was not advanced. 45
and instructional materials." Id. at 609. The program was limited to reimbursement for
programs normally available in public schools and for programs that were in the secular
subjects of mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical science, and physical educa-
tion. Id. at 610. The Rhode Island statute authorized the state to supplement teachers'
salaries in an amount not to exceed fifteen per cent of a teacher's annual salary. Id. at
607. To be eligible for the supplement, a teacher must have taught a subject available in
the public schools and must have used teaching materials which were used in the public
schools. Id. at 608. Also, the teacher must have agreed not to teach a course in religion
while receiving the supplement. Id.
40. Id. at 612-13. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion
; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.'" Id. (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 612.
42. Id. The Court cited Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968). See supra
notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
43. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 613. The Court cited Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 674 (1968). In Walz, the Court stated that "[d]etermining that the legislative
purpose of tax exemption is not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion
does not end the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that the end result - the
effect - is not an excessive government entanglement with religion." Id.
To determine whether there was excessive government entanglement with religion,
the Court in Lemon stated that it was necessary to "examine the character and purposes
of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and
the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority." Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 615.
44. Id. at 615. The Court emphasized that the merits and benefits of parochial
schools were not at issue; the Court recognized their contribution to society, but empha-
sized the historical decision to separate religion and government. Id. at 625.
45. Id. at 619.
A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably
be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment
otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to
determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective ac-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/3
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The Court also stated a concern that the statutes would foster
political division along religious lines, such division being one of
the evils against which the first amendment was designed to pro-
tect.46 The inclusion of the entanglement prong in the test re-
flected the Court's concern with the fundamental principle of
separatism.f
The next major decision in the area of public funding of pa-
rochial schools was Meek v. Pittenger,4" in which the Court con-
sidered a Pennsylvania statute authorizing the commonwealth to
provide "auxiliary services" and to lend textbooks and other in-
structional material to children enrolled in nonpublic elemen-
tary and secondary schools.49 The Court determined that the
loan of textbooks was constitutional, 50 but it struck down the
program for the loan of instructional material (other than text-
ceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment.
Id.
46. Id. at 622. But see Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Rec-
onciling the Conflict, 41 Pirr. L. REv. 673, 684 (1980) (The constitutionality of a state
statute should be weighed on the basis of whether it advances religion, and not because
of potential political divisiveness.). See also M. MCCARTHY, supra note 30, at 123.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. In a concurring opinion to the Lemon
decision, Justice Douglas pursued the problem of entanglement. He stated that public
support of parochial schools "puts those schools under disabilities with which they were
not previously burdened." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 632 (Douglas, J., concurring).
The burden to which Justice Douglas referred was government surveillance and med-
dling. Justice Douglas emphasized the need to protect the interest of the religious insti-
tution in being free from government interference. Id. at 634. See also Committee for
Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (New York statute
which provided funds for the maintenance and repair of, tuition reimbursements for, and
state tax benefits for all parents of students enrolled in nonpublic schools invalidated
under primary effect prong of the Lemon test); Levitt v. Committee for Public Educ. &
Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (New York law for tests and recordkeeping in
nonpublic schools held invalid as offending the secular purpose prong of Lemon test);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (Pennsylvania statute which provided tuition reim-
bursements to parents of nonpublic school students held invalid because it offended the
second prong of Lemon).
48. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
49. Id. at 352. "Auxiliary services include counseling, testing, and psychological ser-
vices, speech and hearing therapy, teaching and related services for exceptional children,
for remedial students, and for the educationally disadvantaged .... " Id. at 352-53. The
state could also lend textbooks free of charge as well as instructional materials such as
"periodicals, photographs, maps, charts, sound recordings [and) films." Id. at 353-55.
50. Id. at 362. The Court relied upon its decision in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968), to uphold the loan of textbooks.
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books) and the auxiliary services program1.5 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court applied the three-part test outlined in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.52 The Court determined that the program to loan in-
structional material had a secular purpose and satisfied the first
prong of the test.5 3 The Court found, however, that the program
to loan instructional materials failed the second prong because it
had the primary effect of advancing religion.54 The Court deter-
mined that when aid was directed towards an institution with a
substantially religious mission, that aid had the unconstitutional
effect of promoting religion.55
In examining the auxiliary services program, the Court
found that the state performed important educational functions
in schools where the advancement of religion was maintained
and where education was an integral part of the religious mis-
sion.56 Focusing on the entanglement prong of the test, the
Court determined that there was excessive entanglement of gov-
ernment in religion, consisting of both administrative and politi-
cal entanglement.5 7 Administrative entanglement existed be-
51. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 363, 372.
52. 403 U.S. at 602, 612-13. The Court emphasized, however, that "the tests must
not be viewed as setting the precise limits to the necessary constitutional inquiry, but
serve only as guidelines with which to identify instances in which the objectives of the
Establishment Clause have been impaired." Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 359.
53. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 363. The Court stated that the legislative purpose
was to extend to every schoolchild in the commonwealth the benefits of free educational
aids. The Court accepted "the legitimacy of this secular legislative purpose." Id.
54. Id. at 363. The Court found that the program had "the unconstitutional primary
effect of advancing religion because of the predominantly religious character of the
schools benefiting from the Act." Id. The Court also found that "the massive aid pro-
vided the church-related nonpublic schools of Pennsylvania by Act 195 is neither indi-
rect nor incidental." Id. at 365.
55. Id. at 366. Because the Court determined that the instructional material loan
program had the impermissible effect of advancing religion, thus failing the second prong
of the test, there was no need to examine the program under the third prong. Id. at 363
n.13.
56. Id. at 371.
To be sure, auxiliary-services personnel, because not employed by the nonpublic
schools, are not directly subject to the discipline of a religious authority. But they
are performing important educational services in schools in which education is an
integral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere dedi-
cated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly maintained.
Id.
57. Id. at 372. "This potential for political entanglement, together with the adminis-
trative entanglement which would be necessary to ensure that auxiliary-services person-
nel remain strictly neutral and nonideological when functioning in church-related
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/3
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cause the state would have to engage in surveillance to ensure
that teachers did not promote religion." There was also political
entanglement because appropriations were considered each year,
and there existed the opportunity for "repeated confrontation
between proponents and opponents of the auxiliary-services
program. '59
In Mueller v. Allen,60 the Court, in a five-to-four decision,
upheld a Minnesota statute which permitted state taxpayers to
claim a state income tax deduction for certain expenses incurred
by dependents attending elementary and secondary schools.",
The majority characterized the Lemon test as a well-settled
principle which provided "no more than a signpost" in the con-
stitutional analysis and that, therefore, a caveat should be kept
in mind when applying the test. 2 Thus, any program which
somehow aided a religiously affiliated institution was not neces-
sarily unconstitutional.6 3
schools, compels the conclusion that Act 194 violates the constitutional prohibition
against laws 'respecting an establishment of religion.'" Id.
58. Id. "To be certain that auxiliary teachers remain religiously neutral, as the Con-
stitution demands, the State would have to impose limitations on the activities of auxil-
iary personnel and then engage in some form of continuing surveillance to ensure that
those restrictions were being followed." Id.
59. Id. There was evidence in this case of the kind of division the Court would ex-
hibit in future cases concerning aid to parochial schools. For example, Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices Rehnquist and White stated that they would have upheld the auxiliary
services program. Id. at 385, 391. Chief Justice Burger did not find excessive entangle-
ment and was concerned that children were being deprived of needed programs. Id. at
385-86. Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion joined by Justice White, articulated a concern
that the Court was supporting a purely secular society. He observed that
[tihe Court apparently believes that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment not only mandates religious neutrality on the part of government but
also requires that this Court go further and throw its weight on the side of those
who believe that our society as a whole should be a purely secular one. Nothing in
the First Amendment or in the cases interpreting it requires such an extreme ap-
proach to this difficult question ....
Id. at 395 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
61. Id. at 390-91. Deductions were allowed for expenses incurred for "tuition, text-
books, and transportation." Id. at 391.
62. Id. at 394.
63. Id. at 393. "One fixed principle in this field is our consistent rejection of the
argument that 'any program which in some manner aids an institution with a religious
affiliation' violates the Establishment Clause." Id. (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734, 742 (1973)).
The Court found that the program had a discernible secular purpose and therefore
13
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Despite the Court's willingness to invalidate public aid to
parochial schools since the modern view of the first amend-
ment's establishment clause emerged in 1947 in the Everson
case, state programs designed to aid and fund nonpublic schools
have greatly expanded in recent years." Lemon v. Kurtzman"5
and its progeny show that the establishment clause requires
state neutrality vis-a-vis religion, but the principles evinced in
those cases are not easily applied.6 6 State tax dollars may be
used to enhance secular aspects of nonpublic education, but
courts must be on guard to the fact that when public funds as-
sist a sectarian organization in order to carry out a secular task,
met the first prong of the Lemon test. "A state's decision to defray the cost of educa-
tional expenses incurred by parents - regardless of the type of schools their children
attend - evidences a purpose that is both secular and understandable." Id. at 395. The
Court also found that the program did not have the primary effect of advancing religion,
and therefore, the program met the requirements of the second prong. Id. This was so
because the Court determined that "the deduction [was] available for educational ex-
penses incurred by all parents, including those whose children attendled] public schools
and those whose children attend[ed] non-sectarian private schools or sectarian private
schools." Id. at 397 (emphasis in original). Also, the aid was disbursed to the parents and
not through the schools which lessened the likelihood that the state was supporting reli-
gion. Id. at 399. In contrast to the dissent, the majority declined to engage in an empiri-
cal inquiry to determine whether the program had the effect of advancing religion. Id. at
401. Moreover, the Court found no excessive entanglement because the only state sur-
veillance necessary would be to determine whether a particular textbook qualified for a
deduction. Id. at 403. Therefore, while applying the Lemon test cautiously, the Court
upheld the Minnesota statute.
The dissent, however, determined that the establishment clause prohibits a state
from subsidizing religious education either directly or indirectly. Id. at 404. Concluding
that the Minnesota statute violated the establishment clause, the dissent focused on the
program's effect during the 1978-1979 school year; it found that 95% of the students in
private schools attended sectarian schools, and that although the deduction was available
to parents of children in public schools, those parents did not pay tuition or expenses
(unless the child attended school in another district, but only 79 out of the 815,000 pub-
lic school children attended school outside of their district). Id. at 405. The dissent char-
acterized the statute's effect as indirect aid which was impermissible because the tuition
deduction was a financial incentive for parents to send their children to parochial
schools. Id. at 407. The dissent also found no restriction in the program which would
guarantee a separation of religious and educational functions. Id.
64. See Education Daily, Nov. 3, 1982, at 5. In addition to the fiscal crisis which
faces nonpublic education, the burgeoning interest nationwide in providing alternatives
to public schools suggests that state assistance to nonpublic schools will continue. See
McCarthy, supra note 30, at 132-33.
65. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
66. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976).
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the organization's resources are freed for religious purposes.6 7 At
present, the parochial aid cases do not present clarity and, ac-
cording to one commentator, they seem to be mere "ad hoc judg-
ments which are incapable of being reconciled on any principled
basis." 8
C. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
196569 was intended to provide funds to school systems in low
income areas.70 Recognizing that concentrations of low income
families negatively impact an educational agency's ability to
serve the special educational needs of those families' children,
71
Title I provides assistance to school systems with children who
are educationally deprived.72 These children must reside in areas
with high concentrations of low income families.73 The funds
were intended to be used for programs designated by local edu-
67. Id. at 747; See MCCARTHY, supra note 30, at 132.
68. Choper, supra note 46, at 680. See also Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Secta-
rian Schools: A Study in Corrosive Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REV. 783, 816 (1978) (Begin-
ning with Everson, the Court "started down a conceptual road of uncertain
destination.").
69. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-4206 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
70. 20 U.S.C. § 2701 (1982). Section 2701 provides:
In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-income families
and the impact that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of
local educational agencies to support adequate educational programs, the Con-
gress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial
assistance (as set forth in the following parts of this subchapter) to local educa-
tional agencies serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income
families to expand and improve their educational programs by various means (in-
cluding pre-school programs) which contribute particularly to meeting the special
educational needs of educationally deprived children.
71. Id.
72. 20 U.S.C. § 3804(a) (1982). Section 3804(a) provides: "Each State and local edu-
cational agency shall use the payments under this subchapter for programs and projects
(including the acquisition of equipment and, where necessary, the construction of school
facilities) which are designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally de-
prived children."
73. 20 U.S.C. § 3805(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 3805(b) provides: "The
application described in subsection (a) of this section shall be approved if ... the pro-
grams and projects described in (1) (A) are conducted in attendance areas of such agency
having the highest concentration of low-income children."
19861
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cational agencies 74 to supplement programs which would be
made available through the use of non-federal funds.75 In Agui-
lar v. Felton,7' Title I funds were used by the City of New York
to support a "shared-time" program 77 in which remedial subjects
were taught to nonpublic school students by public school pro-
fessionals.78 In short, the program aided certain sectarian schools
by allowing the schools to offer a complete curriculum, partly at
public expense.79
III. Aguilar v. Felton
A. Facts
Under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965, New York City used federal funds to provide in-
structional services to parochial school children who were educa-
74. 20 U.S.C. § 3805(a) (1982). Section 3805(a) provides:
A local educational agency may receive a grant under this subchapter for any fis-
cal year if it has on file with the State educational agency an application which
describes the programs and projects to be conducted with such assistance for a
period of not more than three years, and such application has been approved by
the State educational agency.
75. 20 U.S.C. § 3807(b) (Supp. III 1985). The funds were to be used to supplement
programs and not to supplant the use of non-federal funds for those programs. Section
3807(b) provides:
A local educational agency may use funds received under this subchapter only so
as to supplement and, to the extent practical, increase the level of funds that
would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be made available from non-Federal
sources for the education of pupils participating in programs and projects assisted
under this subchapter, and in no case may such funds be so used as to supplant
such funds from such non-Federal sources. In order to demonstrate compliance
with this subsection . . . no local education agency shall be required to provide
services under this subchapter outside the regular classroom or school program.
76. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
77. The United States Senate Subcommittee on Education defined "shared-time"
programs in 1963:
As generally used in current literature in the field of education, the term 'shared
time' means an arrangement for pupils enrolled in nonpublic elementary or sec-
ondary schools to attend public schools for instruction in certain subjects ... re-
garded as mainly or entirely secular, such as laboratory science or home
economics.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PROPOSED
FEDERAL PROMOTION OF "SHARE TIME EDUCATION" 1 (Comm. Print 1963), See McCABRTHY,
supra note 30, at 103.
78. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3233.
79. Id. See MCCARTHY, supra note 30, at 104.
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tionally deprived.80 The programs which were funded included
"remedial reading, reading skills, remedial mathematics, English
as a second language, and guidance services." 8' Of all those chil-
dren eligible to benefit under Title I during the 1981-1982 school
year, 13.2% were enrolled in private schools.82 Of that group,
84% were enrolled in schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic
Archdiocese of New York and the Diocese of Brooklyn and 8%
were enrolled in Hebrew day schools.8 3
The programs were taught on parochial school grounds by
public school employees who were directed to refrain from be-
coming involved in religious activities conducted at the schools.8
All materials and equipment used in the programs were supplied
by the federal government.8 5 The teaching professionals were re-
sponsible for the selection of participating students. 6 The teach-
ers were supervised by field personnel who attempted to make at
least one unannounced visit to the classroom each month.87
Field personnel in turn reported to a program coordinator.8 Pa-
rochial school administrators were not involved in operating the
program, except to clear the rooms used by public school person-
nel of all religious symbols.89 The dispute in this case arose when
six federal taxpayers sought to enjoin the use of federal funds by
New York City to finance the shared-time programs.90
80. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3235 (1985).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. The program coordinators also attempted to make unannounced visits to the
classrooms. Id.
89. Id.
90. Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Educ. 739 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1984).
The original defendants in the action were the Secretary of the United States Depart-
ment of Education and the Chancellor of the Board of Education of the City of New
York. Id. at 49. Four individuals whose children attended non-public schools in New
York City and received remedial assistance under the Title I program were allowed to
intervene as defendants. Id. at 52.
1986]
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B. The Lower Court
The six plaintiffs commenced an action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging
that the Title I program violated the establishment clause of the
first amendment of the Constitution.9 1 Affirming the program's
constitutionality, the district court placed dispositive reliance on
National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty
v. Harris.2 Harris dealt with an identical challenge to the Title I
programs, and the District Court for the Southern District of
New York determined that the programs were constitutional. 8
The Aguilar court therefore granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment.9 4
On appeal to the United States Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, the district court's decision was reversed.9 5 Holding that
the establishment clause prohibited use of federal funds to pro-
vide religious schools with public school teachers and profession-
als, 96 the Second Circuit found that the program involved exces-
sive government entanglement with religion. 7 The court reached
this conclusion despite recognition of the strong humanitarian
desire to find the program constitutional - people want to al-
low parochial schools to be able to provide their students with
remedial programs.9 8 The Second Circuit concluded, however,
that the Framers' objective in drafting the first amendment was
to restrain government activity in religion. 99
The defendants appealed to the United States Supreme
91. Id. The district court opinion was not recorded because the court followed the
decision in National Coalition for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F.
Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 808 (1980).
92. 489 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y.) appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 808 (1980). Harris was
decided while this case was pending in the district court.
93. Id. at 1250.
94. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3236.
95. Felton v. Secretary, United States Dep't if Educ., 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984).
96. Id. at 49-50. The court stated that "the Establishment Clause. .. constitutes an
insurmountable barrier to the use of federal funds to send public school teachers and
other professionals into religious schools to carry on instruction, remedial or otherwise,
or to provide clinical and guidance services of the sort at issue here." Id.
97. Id. at 64.
98. Id. at 71.
99. Id. at 72. The court stated that "efficiency was not the objective of the framers
of the Bill of Rights; they aimed to restrain government from certain acts which legista-
tive majorities had determined to be wise." Id.
[Vol. 6:639
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Court. The Court concluded that jurisdiction by appeal did not
lie because the decision of the Second Circuit was not a final
judgment which held an Act of Congress unconstitutional.100
The Court determined to treat the appeal papers as a petition
for a writ of certiorari, however, and the writ was granted.101
IV. The United States Supreme Court Opinions
A. The Majority
In a five-to-four decision,102 the Court applied the three-
part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman'°3 and determined that the use
of Title I funds by the City of New York to aid the shared-time
program in parochial schools entailed too much state entangle-
ment with religion.'0 4 Excessive entanglement arose because the
program required pervasive supervision by the government in
order to ensure that the program did not promote religion. 10 5
The majority focused on the entanglement aspect of the pro-
gram, and, in doing so, stated that the use of the entanglement
test was rooted in two concerns.10 6 First, governmental support
of a given denomination causes the religious freedom of other
sects to suffer.10 7 Moreover, the Court found that the religious
freedom of adherents to a government-supported denomination
100. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3236. The Court determined that the appeal
from the Second Circuit was taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, but also found that the ap-
peal did not meet the requirements of that statute, and it was therefore dismissed for
want of jurisdiction. Id. at 3236 n.7.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
103. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
104. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3239 (1985). This case was decided at the
same time as Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985). In that case the
Court held that the remedial and enhancement programs there were unconstitutional.
See supra note 1.
105. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3236-37. "Even where state aid to parochial institutions
does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, the provision of such aid may
nonetheless violate the Establishment Clause owing to the nature of the interaction of
church and state in the administration of that aid." Id. at 3237. The majority did not
examine the other two prongs of the Lemon test.
106. Id. at 3237.
107. Id. The Court stated that "[w]hen the state becomes enmeshed with a given
denomination in matters of religious significance, the freedom of religious belief of those
who are not adherents of that denomination suffers, even when the governmental pur-
pose underlying the involvement is largely secular." Id.
1986]
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would also suffer.'0 8 These concerns reflect a consideration for
the fundamental principle of separatism and stem from the
Court's recognition that government and religion each perform
best when separated. 10 9
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that
the supervisory system designed to prevent the Title I program
from being used to inculcate the religious beliefs of the parochial
schools inevitably resulted in the excessive entanglement of
church and state."' Reciting the similarities between the pre-
sent case and the services program struck down in Meek v. Pit-
tenger,"' the Court expressed concern that the instruction was
given in schools where education was an integral part of the reli-
gious mission." 2 The critical elements of entanglement were pre-
sent in both cases." 3 One critical element was that the aid was
provided in a purely sectarian environment." 4 Another was that
the aid was in the form of teachers, which required supervision
to ensure that the aid did not contain a religious message." 5 The
Court determined that such an extent of supervision forced ex-
cessive entanglement because agents of the state were required
to visit the religious schools on a regular basis."' Religious
schools were required to tolerate an ongoing presence of state
officials in order to "guard" against the infiltration of religious
108. Id. "[Tihe freedom of even the adherents of the denomination is limited by the
governmental intrusion into sacred matters." Id.
109. Id. (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)) ("[Tlhe
First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best
work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective
sphere."). See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying texts.
110. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3236-37. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited its
decisions in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) and Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975).
111. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
112. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3238.
113. Id.
114. Id. In Aguilar, for example, "many of the schools... receive funds and report
back to their affiliated church, require attendance at church religious exercises, begin the
school day or class period with prayer, and grant preference in admission to members of
the sponsoring denomination." Id.
115. Id. The Court stated that "because assistance is provided in the form of teach-
ers, ongoing inspection is required to ensure the absence of a religious message." See
supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
116. Id. "Agents of the State must visit and inspect the religious school regularly,
alert for the subtle or overt presence of religious matter in Title I classes." Id.
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thought."7
Along related lines, the Court also expressed concern about
the secularization of religious schools. 118 For example, the pro-
gram required religious school administrators to obey the public
school personnel's determination of which religious symbols
were required to be removed from the classrooms.119 In short,
although the program was well-intentioned, New York City vio-
lated the constitutional principle that the state or federal gov-
ernment shall neither promote nor hinder religion through gov-
ernmental benefits or excessive governmental entanglement with
religion. 120
B. The Concurrence
Concurring in the Court's holding but not its rationale, Jus-
tice Powell expressed concern about the extent of political en-
tanglement and the fact that the program failed the effects
prong of the Lemon test as well.12 1 Observing that New York
City has a varied sectarian population, 2 there existed the likeli-
hood that politics would be involved in decisions to provide aid
to parochial schools.123 Such involvement of politics with religion
was viewed to be another form of excessive government entan-
117. Id. at 3239. "In short, the religious school, which has as a primary purpose the
advancement and preservation of a particular religion must endure the ongoing presence
of state personnel whose primary purpose is to monitor teachers and students in an at-
tempt to guard against the infiltration of religious thought." Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. "In addition, the religious school must obey these same agents when they
make determinations as to what is and what is not a 'religious symbol' and thus off limits
in a Title I classroom." Id.
120. Id. The Court concluded that
[d]espite the well-intentioned efforts taken by the City of New York, the program
remains constitutionally flawed owing to the nature of the aid, to the institution
receiving the aid, and to the constitutional principles that they implicate - that
neither the State nor Federal Government shall promote or hinder a particular
faith or faith generally through the advancement of benefits or through the exces-
sive entanglement of church and state in the administration of those benefits.
Id.
121. Id. at 3240-41.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 3240. "In states such as New York that have large and varied sectarian
populations, one can be assured that politics will enter into any state decision to aid
parochial schools." Id.
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glement in religion.1 24
Justice Powell also addressed the effects prong of the
Lemon test,125 determining that funds provided under the Title
I program were tantamount to a state subsidy of the parochial
schools because such subsidies relieved schools of the duty to
provide remedial and supplemental programs. 26  The public
school professionals assumed some of the parochial schools' edu-
cational responsibilities, and Justice Powell did not consider
that type of aid to be the indirect aid that would be permissible
under the Constitution. 2 ' In sum, Justice Powell concluded that
the program failed both the entanglement and effects prongs of
the Lemon test. 2 '
C. The Dissent
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion which ques-
tioned both the Court's analysis under and continued use of the
entanglement test.'2 9 Justice O'Connor concluded that the Title
124. Id. at 3241. "In short, aid to parochial schools of the sort at issue here poten-
tially leads to 'that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life that, as
history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the
breaking point.'" Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
[T]he type of aid provided in New York by the Title I program amounts to a state
subsidy of the parochial schools by relieving those schools of the duty to provide
the remedial and supplemental education their children require. This is not the
type of "indirect and incidental effect beneficial to [the] religious institution" that
we suggested in Nyquist would survive Establishment Clause scrutiny.
Id. (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 3241-42. "The constitutional defect in the Title I program, as indicated
above, is that it provides a direct financial subsidy to be administered in significant part
by public school teachers within parochial schools - resulting in both the advancement
of religion and forbidden entanglement." Id.
129. Id. at 3243. Justice O'Connor addressed both the entanglement prong and the
effects prong in her analysis of the Title I program.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist also filed brief dissenting opinions.
Chief Justice Burger stated his concern that invalidating the program would prevent
children from receiving needed remedial programs. The Chief Justice also voiced his con-
cern that the Court had become unduly obsessed with the criteria defined in the Lemon
case. Id. at 3242.
Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which he stated that the Court had
strayed from the concerns which prompted the adoption of the first amendment. He
noted the "Catch-22" paradox adopted by the Court as follows: "It]he aid must be super-
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I program did not have the primary effect of advancing religion
because the public school professionals were not likely to indoc-
trinate students in religious teachings.3 0 The teachers were su-
pervised, thus reducing the risk that they would inculcate reli-
gion in their classes.13 ' Moreover, the Title I program was not a
state subsidy of religion because it contained a statutory provi-
sion which required that the funds supplement and not supplant
services provided by the local educational agency. 13
Addressing the entanglement issue, Justice O'Connor stated
that because the majority could not invalidate the program
under the effects prong, it had to invalidate it under the entan-
glement prong.'33 Concluding that the state's supervision of the
teaching professionals did not rise to the level of unconstitu-
tional entanglement, Justice O'Connor stated that the degree of
supervision required was exaggerated by the majority.' Fur-
vised to ensure no entanglement but the supervision itself is held to cause an entangl-
ment." Id. at 3243.
130. Id. at 3245. "New York City's public Title I instructors are professional educa-
tors who can and do follow instructions not to inculcate religion in their classes." Id.
131. Id.
They are unlikely to be influenced by the sectarian nature of the parochial schools
where they teach, not only because they are carefully supervised by public offi-
cials, but also because the vast majority of them visit several different schools
each week and are not of the same religion as their parochial students.
Id.
132. Id.
The only type of impermissible effect that arguably could carry over from the
Grand Rapids decision to this litigation, then, is the effect of subsidizing "the
religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of
their responsibility for teaching secular subjects." That effect is tenuous, however,
in light of the statutory directive that Title I funds may be used only to provide
services that otherwise would not be available to the participating students.
Id. (citations omitted).
133. Id. at 3246. "Recognizing the weakness of any claim of an improper purpose or
effect, the Court today relies entirely on the entanglement prong of Lemon to invalidate
the New York City Title I program." Id.
134. Id.
Just as the risk that public schoolteachers in parochial classrooms will inculcate
religion has been exaggerated, so has the degree of supervision required to manage
that risk. In this respect the New York Title I program is instructive. What super-
vision has been necessary in New York to enable public school teachers to help
disadvantaged children for 19 years without once proselytizing? Public officials
have prepared careful instructions warning public schoolteachers of their exclu-
sively secular mission, and have required Title I teachers to study and observe
them.... To ensure compliance with the rules, a field supervisor and a program
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thermore, the public school teachers had full responsibility for
the selection of students and were not answerable to the paro-
chial school administration. 135 In short, there was no excessive
government entanglement with religion.13 6
Justice O'Connor also criticized the usefulness of the entan-
glement prong, 37 because programs with valid purposes and ef-
fects have been struck down only because of undue entangle-
ment. 3 8 Advocating a return to the pre-Lemon purposes and
effects test, Justice O'Connor suggested incorporating any en-
tanglement considerations into the effects prong.139  Justice
O'Connor argued that a program should not be struck down sim-
ply because a state supervises the program to ensure that the
coordinator, who are full-time public school employees, make unannounced visits
to each teacher's classroom at least once a month.
Id. at 3246-47.
135. Id. at 3247.
Under the rules, Title I teachers are not accountable to parochial or private school
officials; they have sole responsibility for selecting the students who participate in
their class, must administer their own tests for determining eligibility, cannot en-
gage in team teaching or cooperative activities with parochial school teachers,
must make sure that all materials and equipment they use are not otherwise used
by the parochial school, and must not participate in religious activities in the
schools or introduce any religious matter into their teaching.
Id.
136. Id. "The Court concludes that this degree of supervision of public school em-
ployees by other public school employees constitutes excessive entanglement of church
and state. I cannot agree." Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
I adhere to doubts about the entanglement test that were expressed in Lynch [v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)]. It is curious indeed to base our interpretation of
the Constitution on speculation as to the likelihood of a phenomenon which the
parties may create merely by prosecuting a lawsuit. My reservations about the
entanglement test, however, have come to encompass its institutional aspects as
well. As Justice REHNQUIST has pointed out, many of the inconsistencies in our
Establishment Clause decisions can be ascribed to our insistence that parochial
aid programs with a valid purpose and effect may still be invalid by virtue of
undue entanglement.
Id. (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985)).
139. Id. at 3248.
Pervasive institutional involvement of church and state may remain relevant in
deciding the effect of a statute which is alleged to violate the Establishment
Clause, Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), but state efforts to ensure
that public resources are used only for nonsectarian ends should not in themselves
serve to invalidate an otherwise valid statute.
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public funds are used only for nonsectarian ends. 140
V. Analysis
In the hotly-contested decision of Aguilar v. Felton, the Su-
preme Court revealed the continuing tension that exists among
the members of the Court on the issue of the appropriate
method of analysis in first amendment establishment clause
cases. While the cases show that the Court disallowed most
types of parochial aid from 1971 to 1976, recent cases such as
Mueller v. Allen 4" seemed to reverse this trend.'42 In Aguilar,
the Court took little note of that recent trend and returned to
the less lenient views of parochial aid which governed the early
1970's. The majority in Aguilar relied on the established entan-
glement prong of the Lemon test to invalidate New York City's
Title I program. In a highly critical dissent, Justice O'Connor
found that no entanglement existed, and would also have elimi-
nated the entanglement prong as a separate and distinct consid-
eration in establishment clause cases.
While the entanglement prong can be criticized for its po-
tential for subjectiveness and unreliability, its importance to the
establishment clause doctrine cannot be overlooked nor under-
stated. To remedy some of the potential defects of the entangle-
ment prong, the Court should not mechanically apply the crite-
ria involved, but should also focus on the purposes it serves.
A. Purposes of the Entanglement Prong and its Usefulness in
the Aguilar Case
The free exercise and establishment clauses of the first
amendment have been interpreted as prohibiting the govern-
ment from establishing or interfering with religion, thus requir-
ing a policy of separatism or neutrality towards religion.143 To
140. Id. "If a statute lacks a purpose or effect of advancing or endorsing religion, I
would not invalidate it merely because it requires some ongoing cooperation between
church and state or some state supervision to ensure that state funds do not advance
religion." Id.
141. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
142. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text; Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977); See MCCARTHY, supra note 30, at 124.
143. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1969).
Each value judgment under the Religion Clauses must therefore turn on whether
19861
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determine whether a government program fell within the prohi-
bition, the Court developed the three-part test articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman. In the Lemon decision the Court stated
that "[i]n the absence of precisely stated constitutional prohibi-
tions, we must draw lines with reference to the three main evils
against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford
protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involve-
ment of the sovereign in religious activity.' "144
It is the concern over active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activities which is considered under the entanglement
prong. While it is true that the entanglement concept was first
considered to be part of the effects test,145 its importance as a
separate test should not be overlooked. By maintaining the en-
tanglement prong as a distinctive and potentially dispositive fac-
tor, the Court recognizes the importance of the fundamental
principle of separatism. 1"
Separatism, or neutrality, embraces the view of James
Madison that government and religion each functions best when
it is independent of the other.147 In this regard, the entangle-
ment prong functions as a protection of government as well as
religion. For example, a government program may neither ad-
vance nor inhibit religion but may so closely involve religion in
political matters as to cause political division along religious
lines. As stated previously, such division was one of the evils
against which the first amendment was designed to protect. 148
particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with religious be-
liefs and practices or have the effect of doing so. Adherence to the policy of neu-
trality that derives from an accommodation of the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses has prevented the kind of involvement that would tip the balance
toward government control of churches or governmental restraint on religious
practices.
Id.
144. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
145. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 674. "Determining that the legislative pur-
pose of tax exemption is not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion
does not end the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that the end result - the
effect - is not an excessive government entanglement with religion." Id.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21 and 47.
147. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
148. See supra text accompanying note 46. See also Freund, supra note 17, at 1686.
In discussing the concept of separatism, Freund used the example of the government
[Vol. 6:639
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss4/3
AGUILAR v. FELTON
Therefore, it is important to maintain the entanglement prong
as a distinctive analytical element.
The majority in the Aguilar decision appropriately took
note of the separate concerns which the entanglement prong ad-
dressed by recognizing that religious freedom could be infringed
upon even when the governmental purpose was secular.14 9 In
Aguilar, the secular purpose of the aid was to provide educa-
tional services. Although religion may not be advanced or inhib-
ited by a government program because the aid is secular in na-
ture, freedom of religious belief may still be impinged by the
government intrusion into the religious institution. Thus, the
Court found that the monitoring involved in the New York City
program produced a continuing relationship between religion
and government that violated the principle of separatism.1 5 0
Justice O'Connor's dissent characterized the majority's em-
ployment of the entanglement prong as leading to inconsistent
decisions because it could be used to invalidate a program which
had passed both the purpose and effects test.15 1 This criticism
ignores the purpose of the entanglement prong, however, be-
cause if a program has a valid purpose and effect only because of
excessive government supervision, the program should be uncon-
stitutional. Excessive government involvement in religious af-
fairs should not be allowed to correct a program that would oth-
erwise have the unconstitutional effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion.
The Aguilar decision is illustrative of this point. The propo-
nents of New York City's program argued that the program was
unlike the one that had been struck down in Grand Rapids
supplying textbooks to parochial schools. "For the identity and integrity of religion, sep-
arateness stands as an ultimate safeguard. And on the secular side, to link responsibility
for parochial and public school texts is greatly to intensify sectarian influences in local
politics at one of its most sensitive points." Id.
149. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
150. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3239. "[Tlhe detailed monitoring and close administra-
tive contact required to maintain New York's Title I program can only produce a kind of
continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize."
[citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)]. The numerous judgments that
must be made by agents of the state concern matters that may be subtle and controver-
sial, yet may be of deep religious significance to the controlling denominations. As gov-
ernment agents must make these judgments, the dangers of political divisiveness along
religious lines increase. Id.
151. Id. at 3247.
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School District v. Ball'52 as having the unconstitutional effect of
advancing religion. The Court stated that the supervision of the
teachers in the New York City program, which was not present
in the Grand Rapids program, may have prevented the program
from having the primary effect of advancing religion, but the ex-
cessive entanglement involved in the monitoring made the pro-
gram unconstitutional.153
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell took note of the
difficulty that governments face in attempting to provide aid
programs which do not have an unconstitutional effect of ad-
vancing religion, and which do not involve excessive government
entanglement with religion. 54 Justice Powell emphasized that,
although the requirements of Lemon place a burden upon gov-
ernments, "the Court has never foreclosed the possiblity that
some types of aid to parochial schools could be valid under the
Establishment Clause. 1 55
Recognition of the need for the entanglement prong in es-
tablishment clause analysis, however, does not dispel criticism of
the test. Also at issue has been the method of application, which
has led to some anomalous results. 5 6 An examination of the ap-
propriate criteria for analysis under the entanglement prong is
152. 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985).
153. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3237.
154. Id. at 3241.
I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments are placed by the interac-
tion of the "effects" and entanglement prongs of the Lemon test. Our decisions
require governments extending aid to parochial schools to tread an extremely nar-
row line between being certain that the "principal or primary effect" of the aid is
not to advance religion, and avoiding excessive entanglement.
Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612).
155. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3241. Justice Powell cited as examples of acceptable
types of aid to parochial schools the assistance discussed in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968), in which the Court upheld state income tax deductions for certain edu-
cational expenses, and in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), in which the
Court upheld reimbursements for transportation expenses to school.
156. Aguilar, at 3247. Justice O'Connor found the entanglement prong to be the
source of inconsistencies in establishment clause decisions.
For example, we permit a State to pay for bus transportation to a parochial
school, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711
(1947), but preclude States from providing buses for parochial school field trips,
on the theory such trips involve excessive state supervision of the parochial offi-
cials who lead them.
Id. (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 226, 254 (1977).
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therefore re 4uired.
B. Criteria for the Entanglement Prong
Although the entanglement prong may be criticizied for its
subjectiveness, Lemon articulated criteria which could be con-
sidered in an entanglement analysis. These criteria include "the
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting rela-
tionship between the government and the religious authority."' 57
Using this criteria as a guideline leads to a less subjective analy-
sis under the entanglement prong.158
Although the Court in Aguilar did not specifically refer to
these criteria in its analysis, it did focus on the three areas men-
tioned above. For example, the Court noted that a critical ele-
ment of entanglement was that the institutions benefiting from
the Title I program were sectarian in character.1 59 The Court
also stated that the nature of the aid, in the form of teachers,
was of a type that would require supervision.6 0 Finally, the
Court considered the resulting relationship between New York
City (the government) and the parochial school (the religious
institution).
The critical elements of that ongoing relationship were that
the religious institution, with its emphasis on advancement of
religion through education, was required to endure a government
presence designed to guard against that advancement of religion
through education.' 6' Moreover, the administration of the pro-
gram required ongoing cooperation with the parochial schools,
and under certain critical circumstances, the parochial school
administrators were required to abide by the decisions of the
157. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 615.
158. It should be acknowledged that the entanglement prong is by nature a subjec-
tive analysis. What is needed in these establishment clause cases is not an abandonment
of the entanglement prong because of its potential for subjectiveness, but rather a set of
criteria that would enhance the reliability and workability of the prong.
159. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3238. "First, as noted above, the aid is provided in a
pervasively sectarian environment." Id.
160. Id. "Second, because assistance is provided in the form of teachers, ongoing
inspection is required to ensure the absence of a religious message." Id.
161. Id. at 3239. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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public school personnel.162 The resulting relationship between
New York City and the parochial schools was one in which the
government's presence threatened to secularize the religious
functions of the parochial schools. Such a relationship is in con-
tradiction of the fundamental principle of separatism which the
entanglement prong was designed to protect.6 3
In contrast to the majority's use of the criteria stated in
Lemon for examining the entanglement issue, Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion did not explore these areas.
Rather, the dissent focused only on the nature of the aid, reach-
ing the conclusion that the aid was not of the type that caused
excessive government entanglement with religion* The dissent
also ignored other aspects of the aid. For example, Justice
O'Connor did not address the critical concern of the resulting
relationship between the parochial schools and New York City.
It was, therefore, incongruous for Justice O'Connor to make an
appropriate assessment of the extent of entanglement without
examining the underlying church-state relationship.
C. Future Establishment Clause Cases
The Court has struggled with establishment clause cases re-
cently, and has increasingly questioned the use of the Lemon
test generally, and the entanglement prong specifically."6 4 How-
ever, at this time, those calling for an abandonment or revision
of the Lemon test are in the minority on the Court. Presumably,
the Lemon test will not be abandoned completely. Still, there is
a justifiable concern that the principal of separatism will be
weakened should the Court decide to abandon the entanglement
prong of the Lemon test. If there is a perception that the entan-
glement prong is unworkable, the Court should consider the im-
portance of separating governmental and religious functions.
Perhaps such consideration would make the application of the
entanglement prong more uniform.
162. Id. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) in which the Court struck
down an Alabama statute calling for a daily period of silence in public schools to be used
for meditation or voluntary prayer. In that opinion, Justice Rehnquist criticized the
Lemon test and called for its abandonment. Id. at 2517-20.
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VI. Conclusion
Although the ultimate decision in this case may be a harsh
one for those involved in parochial schools, the decision was a
proper one. As citizens of the United States, the American peo-
ple have chosen to sacrifice outright governmental assistance of
religions and religious institutions in exchange for a guarantee of
religious freedom. It matters not that the aid is benevolent, i.e.
assisting schoolchildren. In this case, the potential for infringe-
ment upon religious freedom (e.g. the freedom of parochial
school children to have religion as a part of their entire educa-
tion) was great. The recognized fundamental principle of separa-
tism is an acknowledgement of the potential harm in not insist-
ing that government and religion avoid excessive entanglement.
It is, therefore, vital to an analysis under the establishment
clause that entanglement be considered.
Ann Farrissey Carlson
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